4 Jan 2011

EN / Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy - a book review

On the losing side at the end of the Cold War, Russia had to redefine its place on a geostrategic map and its objectives within its own sphere of influence. Christian Thorun undertook the challenging task of systematising this process as Russia was seeking its new 21st century identity. In a changing political and economic climate, re-establishing national security’s principles was not an immediate process and, as the title may suggest, different ideas played their role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy thinking.

Dr Thorun holds MPhil and DPhil degrees from the University of Oxford but his interests in Russian politics blossomed during his undergraduate studies when he spent a year abroad at the University of St Petersburg in 1999-2000. Although the book was published in 2009, it is mostly based on his PhD thesis from 2005 and could be perceived as an accomplishment of his major academic interest.

In its general field, the book analyses the changes in Russia’s foreign policy between 1992 and 2007, and divides them on four different periods: 1992-1993/94, 1993/94-2000, 2000-2004, and 2004-2007. The author attempts to explain these changes in the Russian leadership’s approach towards the West. Moreover, Thorun assesses the Russian leadership’s ability to adapt the changing circumstances it faced towards the end of the Cold War. He lists external constraints, ideational factors and domestic politics as key impacts on foreign policy thinking and how it varied over the time and across policy areas.

The author’s point of view is not clear, yet a Realist approach, with Russia as an actor dealing with other states in some sort of chaotic and changing environment of international relations where national interests take precedence, seems to be dominant. The book is written in a very theoretical way, almost scientific, however the outcomes cannot produce generalisation to other case studies as the author admits himself (p.149). Due to its style, this is a book clearly written for an academic reader in mind with concepts visibly defined and presented.

Arguments and hypotheses of the book are rather complex and multifaceted, yet well structured. Each chapter analyses how Russia’s foreign policy was changing fifteen years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and what IR theories could be applied at the time. In chapters 2 and 3 Thorun attempts to form a foreign policy model and the evolution of the Russian leadership’s thinking between 1992 and 2007 is described. In the following three chapters, some hypotheses are tested on Russia’s approach to NATO and its enlargement (chapter 4), Russia’s response to the Balkan crises (chapter 5) and the reaction to 9/11 (chapter 6). Consequently, Thorun proves four perceptions of the nature of Russian foreign policy: liberal thinking (1992 - 1993/94), geopolitical Realism (1993/94 – 2000), pragmatic geoeconomic Realism (2004 – 2004) and cultural geostrategic Realism (2004 – 2007). Given the evidence, the arguments are convincing and well-presented. The author uses valid and legitimate case studies to make his point and support the hypotheses.

As a result, the book sums up all changes within Russia’s foreign policy conduct and explains why such changes occurred and identifies further potential developments. Even though the author does not want to make any predictions, his judgement that Medvedev’s lack of legitimacy may lead to another change in Russia’s foreign policy seems to be correct yet again with another swift move towards the West in recent months. The book also offers a unique application of contemporary IR theories in a large-scale case study of modern Russia at the turn of the century. Surprisingly, however, as one of the outcomes it seems that clarity and dispelling of uncertainties in foreign relations seem to come from European and American actors, not from within Russia. Therefore, Russia seems to be more passive, rather reacting and adjusting itself to current events.

However, there are some missing points that should also have been addressed. The book lacks examples of Russia bullying its ‘near abroad’ neighbours with 19th century tactics, as Robert Kagan pointed out in a 2008 Washington Post article (“New Europe, Old Russia”, 6 February 2008), with denied oil supply to Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus; cut off gas supply to Ukraine, Moldova and Poland; and cyber attacks on Estonia. Also, in this sophisticated theoretical analysis, Thorun did not mention how Putin ‘employed’ Gerhard Schröder in a very corrupt manner to lead the Baltic pipeline project in 2005. Neither does the book consider how in 2008 the Russian government threatened Ukraine with nuclear missiles if they joined NATO, even though it happened outside the book’ scoop. An obvious tool missing in Russia’s foreign policy is soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye in “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics” (2004), an aspect which is unconsidered by Thorun.

The book also does not address BRIC summits and the changes in Russia’s foreign policy thinking as encouraged by the cooperation with other emerging economies and, militarily, within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Even though the author somehow admits this limitation, the study without a broader context cannot be fully successful. With all the cases presented in the book, there are still some missing studies with the economy at stake and how Russia deals with emerging security threats (such as terrorism, vide Beslan, Moscow metro bombings or Ost-Nord siege).

Unfortunately, the book also lacks a thoughtful analysis of the internal discourse on foreign policy in Russia, since Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov are not the only politicians left in the country. Yet, at the same time, Russia is not presented in the book as an authoritarian state with limited democratic freedom.

While reading “Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy” it is hard to avoid a constant impression that it is a published PhD thesis rather than a book for a wider audience with first-hand empirical evidence. Too much emphasis on theory over contingency is a standard mistake in Western IR interpretations of Russian foreign policy and the author is caught into this trap. Russia’s foreign policy is far from being settled.

Christian Thorun
Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post Soviet Russia’s Conduct towards the West
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
214pp; £55 (Amazon.com)
ISBN 978-0-230-55372-9

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